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Abstract:
A clearing member of a Central Counterparty (CCP) is exposed to losses on their default fund
and initial margin contributions. Such losses can be incurred whenever the CCP has insufficient
funds to unwind the portfolio of a defaulting clearing member. This does not necessarily require
the default of the CCP itself. In this note we aim to quantify the risk a financial institution has
when facing a CCP.
We show that a clearing member’s CCP risk is given by a sum of exposures to each of the
other clearing members. This arises because of the implicit default insurance that each member
has provided in the form of mutualised, loss sharing collateral. We calculate the exposures
by explicitly modeling the capital structure of a CCP as well as the loss distributions of the
individual member portfolios.
An important consideration in designing the model is the limited transparency with respect to
the portfolio composition and collateral levels of individual clearing members. To overcome this
we leverage the fact that, for a typical CCP, margin levels are risk-based. In particular, we
parameterise the portfolio loss tail as a Pareto distribution and we calibrate this to the CCP
defined probability of losses exceeding the posted initial margin levels.
A key aspect of the model is that we explicitly take into account wrong-way risk, i.e. the fact
that member defaults are more likely to occur in stressed market conditions, as well as potential
contagion between a member’s default and the losses on his portfolio.
Opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the view of JP Morgan.
We would like to thank Andrew Abrahams for originating the project on CCP risk and for shaping many of the
key ideas. We also thank Regis Guichard, Joe Holderness, Mitchell Smith, Marnie Rosenberg and Rajalakshmi
Ramanath for valuable discussions.
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1 Introduction
The financial crisis of 2008 has resulted in a concerted regulatory drive to substantially increase
the proportion of derivatives that are centrally cleared. The primary motivation is to reduce
bilateral counterparty risk, increase transparency and avoid contagion in the case of the default
of a large financial institution.
Central counterparties (CCPs) are designed to mitigate counterparty risk through multi-lateral
netting, high levels of collateralisation as well as loss mutualisation (c.f. [1] for a quantitative
comparison of the efficiency of multi-lateral vs. bi-lateral netting). Indeed, the default of a CCP
is a rare event and only three have failed in recent times: the Caisse de Liquidation Paris in 1974,
the Kuala Lumpur Commodity Clearing House in 1983 and the Hong Kong Futures Exchange
due to the 1987 market crash (c.f. [2]).
However, this does not mean that a clearing house is riskless. A CCP is a risk sharing arrange-
ment and each member is liable for the performance of all the other members. In moving from
bilateral to central clearing, the risk of counterparty default has been transformed, to a large
extent, into the risk of losses on the mutualised collateral pool (default fund) that each member
has contributed to in order to protect the CCP from default. In particular, in the event of a
clearing member default, all uncollateralised losses arising from the liquidation of the member’s
portfolio will be shared pro-rata amongst the surviving members.
Given the increasing volume and complexity of cleared trades as well as the systemic role of
CCPs, it is important that the risks a clearing member faces are understood and quantified.
Even if loss rates and probabilities should be low due to high levels of collateralisation, the
absolute exposure amounts are likely to be very significant. Past crises have shown that it is
dangerous and costly to underestimate tail risks.
An important difference between bilateral counterparty risk and the risk facing a CCP is that the
CCP risk is not primarily driven by the exposure on a member’s own portfolio. The member’s
CCP risk can increase even if his portfolio does not change. This is because each member has
provided insurance on the tail losses of all other clearing members. Indeed, we will show that a
member’s exposure can be written as a sum of exposures to each clearing member.
These exposures are naturally hedged by buying CDS protection on each of the members. The
amount of protection required depends on the margin and collateral levels held by the CCP as
well as the size of the tails of the portfolio loss distributions, which are specific to the market in
which the CCP is operating. The total cost of protection gives the value of the CCP risk.
This means that for a clearing member to asses his risk towards a CCP he needs information
about the portfolio composition of all other clearing members as well as their posted collateral
levels. This information is typically confidential. What is available to a member are the details
of his own portfolio, total margin levels held by the CCP as well as identities of the other
clearing members. The aim of this paper is to provide a practical model that can give realistic
risk estimates based only on the limited amount of available public data.
We do this by leveraging the risk management framework of the CCP. In particular, we make
use of the fact that it is now standard practice to set initial margin levels using a value-at-risk
(VaR) model. This means that, for a given portfolio, the probability of losses exceeding the
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posted initial margin levels over the liquidation period is given by a fixed probability. This is
set by the CCP and is typically around 1%. This information can be used to fit a parameterised
distribution to the tail of the portfolio losses. Here we choose a Pareto distribution to capture
the heavy tails exhibited by the time series of financial returns.
An important feature of our model is that we explicitly consider wrong-way risk and contagion.
Wrong-way risk arises due to the fact that clearing member defaults are more likely in times
of stress and hence when portfolio losses are large. Contagion refers to the possibility that the
member default itself will cause a shock to the market. This means that losses can be larger
than is implied by the confidence level used in setting margin levels. These two effects are key
risk factors driving the expected losses due to CCP membership (c.f. [3] for an analysis of CCP
expected losses before and after the 1987 market crash).
2 Central Counterparty Structure and Risk
We begin our discussion by taking a closer look at how a clearing house is designed and how
this relates to the risks that a clearing member has when dealing with a CCP. A good overview
can be found in [4].
2.1 Risk Waterfall
A typical CCP has a multi-layer capital structure to protect itself and its members from losses
due to member defaults. In general, the following types of collateral will be held:
Variation Margin: Variation margin is charged or credited daily to clearing member accounts
to cover any portfolio mark-to-market (MtM) changes.
Initial Margin: Initial margin is posted by clearing members to the CCP. This is to cover any
losses incurred in the unwinding of a defaulting member’s portfolio. Typically the margin
is set to cover all losses up to a pre-defined confidence level in normal market conditions.
CCP Equity: A typical CCP will have an equity buffer provided by shareholders. The position
of the equity buffer in the capital structure can vary between CCPs.
Default Fund (funded): Every member contributes to the clearing house default fund. This
acts as a form of mutualised insurance for uncollateralised losses.
Default Fund (unfunded): In addition to the default fund contributions that have been
posted to the CCP, each clearing member is usually committed to providing further funds
if necessary. The maximum amount of additional funds that can be called upon depends
on the CCP. In some cases the liability is uncapped.
Losses arising from a member default will first be covered by the defaulting member’s initial
margin and default fund contribution. Uncollateralised losses will then be charged against the
CCP’s equity and ultimately the mutualised default fund. If all funds are used up and there are
still outstanding losses then the CCP could find itself in default.
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2.2 Default fund risk
If, following a clearing member default, there are losses on the mutualised part of the default
fund then all surviving clearing members are required to recapitalise the fund under CCP rules.
Losses are allocated pro-rata to the surviving members. For example, this can be on the basis
of a member’s share of the total default fund pool, total notional or total risk. However, it does
not depend on the performance of the surviving members’ portfolios at the time of default.
There can be a lag between the clearing member default and any potential recapitalisation of
the default fund. We refer to this as the recapitalisation or allocation period. Depending on
the CCP, this can range from 0 to ca. 30 days (a period of 0 means that losses need to be
recapitalised for each default). At the end of the period the default fund will be recapitalised
for losses due to all defaults in the period.
A financial institution can incur losses due to clearing member defaults as long as they are
members of the CCP. Since the default fund is recapitalised after each recapitalisation period,
it follows that the default fund contribution at risk does not necessarily reduce post a default
event.
2.3 CCP default risk
If losses due to member defaults exceed all funded and unfunded default fund contributions,
then the CCP can be in default itself. Given the high levels of collateralisation that a CCP can
draw upon, this is an extreme tail event.
If a CCP default should occur, the CCP assets will be used to cover the liabilities the CCP
has to the clearing members. Assets potentially available to the CCP in default are the posted
initial margin contributions that are not held in a segregated, default-remote account.
If all of the initial margin is ringfenced then a surviving clearing member will be able to recover
the full margin posted. However, any positive P&L on the clearing member’s portfolio will be
lost.
If the margin is not ringfenced then the pooled margin contributions will be used to offset any
MtM losses on the clearing member’s portfolio. However, the surviving members stand to lose
a portion of their posted initial margin. Total CCP losses would be allocated to each member
pro-rata based on e.g. the share of the posted initial margin, default fund contribution or total
notional. As with the default fund allocation this is independent of the value of the clearing
member’s portfolio at the time of allocation. In particular, a surviving member can incur a loss
even if his portfolio MtM is negative.
In the following we assume that the initial margin is not ringfenced. Even if legally this might
be the case it is unclear that this is enforceable in practice. In addition, typically only a portion
the margin is ringfenced.
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3 CCP Loss Model
In this section we develop our model of a clearing member’s CCP risk.
We consider a central counterparty with N + 1 clearing members CMk with k ∈ {0, .., N}. At
each point in time, t, the posted initial margin of member k is denoted by Mk(t). The funded
default fund contribution is denoted by Dk(t). The total default fund size is thus given by
Dtot(t) ≡
∑N
k=0Dk(t). The CCP equity cushion will be denoted by E.
We now take the position of clearing member CM0. Our aim is to calculate the cost of the risk,
C0(T ), that member CM0 has up to a horizon T due to membership of the CCP. This will be
defined as the member’s discounted expected loss up to time T .
3.1 Portfolio losses
Let us assume that clearing member k has defaulted at time t = τk. We denote the value
of the portfolio of member k at time t by Vk(t). Post-default the portfolio will be unwound
over the liquidation period ∆l. This is typically of the order of 2 to 5 days given that cleared
products tend to be very liquid. Note that up to time τk the portfolio value Vk(t) will have been
collateralised by the variation margin. This means that the loss on the portfolio post-default is
given by the change in value over the liquidation period, i.e. by:
∆Vk(τk) = Vk(τk + ∆l)− Vk(τk). (1)
Here and in the following we use the convention that a positive value of ∆Vk indicates a loss to
the portfolio.
The losses are collateralised by the defaulting members initial margin Mk(τk) and default fund
contribution Dk(τk) at the time of default. The uncollateralised loss
Uk(τk) ≡ (∆Vk(τk)−Mk(τk)−Dk(τk))+
will be covered in the first instance by any available CCP equity cushion. All remaining excess
losses will be allocated amongst the surviving clearing members. Note that, in general, Mk(t) and
Dk(t) are random variables. The collateral levels will change as a function of market volatility
and portfolio composition.
If there is a default at time t, then all losses incurred during the recapitalisation period [t, t+∆r]
will be allocated at time t+ ∆r. Typically ∆r is of the order of 30 days and ∆r > ∆l. To model
this we introduce a timeline, {t0, t1, ..., tn}, up to the horizon T with step ∆r, i.e. tn = T and
ti = t0 + i∆r. We assume that loss allocations happen only at the timeline points ti.
Let s denote the set of indices of all members that have defaulted in the period [ti−1, ti]., i.e.
for each j ∈ s we have ti−1 ≤ τj < ti. Since we are taking the viewpoint of member CM0, we
are assuming throughout that CM0 does not default, i.e. 0 6∈ s. The total excess loss over the
recapitalisation period in the scenario s is given by:
Ltot(ti; s) ≡
∑
j∈s
Uj(τj)− E
+ (2)
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This loss will be allocated amongst the surviving members at time ti. In practice, the mutualised
default fund would be used first to cover the losses. Once both funded and unfunded contribu-
tions are exhausted the CCP would find itself in default. As discussed above, we assume that
in this case the surviving members initial margin would be used to cover any remaining losses.
In addition, we make the conservative and simplifying assumption that all uncollateralised
losses will ultimately need to be covered by the surviving members, i.e. we do not cap our loss
at our total collateral contribution. The approximation is unlikely to be material given that the
probability of losses exceeding the entire default fund as well as all posted initial margin is very
remote. Indeed, we expect the bulk of our losses to be on the default fund.
3.2 Loss allocation
We need to specify how the loss, Ltot, is apportioned to the surviving members. A typical
convention, which we also follow here, is that the allocation is proportional to our contribution
to the default fund as a fraction of the total remaining fund. In particular, the fraction of losses
allocated to member CM0 at time ti is given by:
A0(ti; s) =
D0(ti)
Dtot(ti)−
∑
j∈sDj(ti)
(3)
and the loss that is incurred in scenario s over the recapitalisation period is given by:
L0(ti; s) = A0(ti; s)Ltot(ti; s) (4)
It is straightforward to adapt our methodology to different allocation choices, e.g. based on
initial margin or total collateral. The main point is that the allocated portion increases with
the number of defaults.
3.3 The CCP Counterparty Charge
We are interested in calculating the expected loss
L0(ti) ≡ E [L0(ti; s)] (5)
over the period [ti−1, ti]. This expectation is both over the scenarios s as well as the loss
distribution of the member portfolios.
To formalise this we introduce the total set of default scenarios, S, as the set of all unique,
non-empty, subsets of I(N) ≡ {1, 2, ..., N} (Note that CM0 is excluded). This allows writing
the expectation above as:
L0(ti) =
∑
s∈S
P (s; ti)E [A0(ti; s)|s]E [Ltot(ti; s)|s] (6)
where P (s; ti) is the probability of the scenario s occurring in the period [ti−1, ti]. As detailed
in the next section, we assume that conditional on the scenario s, the allocation is fixed and
independent of the portfolio losses.
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To obtain the total expected loss up to horizon T we need to combine the expected losses over
the different periods. After each allocation period the default fund will be recapitalised by the
surviving members. We make the steady-state assumption that after recapitalisation the risk
profile of the CCP is the same as it was before in the sense that defaulting members will have
been replaced and their portfolios will have been taken over. In particular, we assume that the
expected losses in the different allocation periods are independent.
Note that if the CCP were to default, then our steady-state assumption would clearly no longer
hold since in this case our exposure to the CCP would cease. However, the probability of this
event is small and hence the approximation is unlikely to be material.
With these assumptions, the CCP risk can be written as the sum over the discounted loss
expectations at all timeline points, i.e.:
C0(T ) =
n∑
i=1
Z(t0, ti)L0(ti) (7)
where Z(t0, ti) is the discount factor up to ti, which we have assumed to be independent of the
allocated loss.
In the following sections we look at how the expected loss and allocation in equation (6) can be
calculated.
3.4 Expected Collateral Levels
Margin and default fund levels can vary over time due to changing market conditions as well as
changing portfolio composition.
We assume here that the portfolio composition stays constant over time. The effect that we
need to capture is that, conditional on member default, we expect margin levels to be high.
This is because member defaults are more likely to occur in periods of market stress rather
than completely idiosyncratically. This is a wrong-way risk effect familiar from credit value
adjustment (CVA) calculations.
Here we make a simple assumption; namely that in a scenario where clearing member CMk has
defaulted, the initial margin as well as the default fund contributions are given by stressed levels
M∗k and D
∗
k, which are related to today’s margin levels by a scaling factor. In other words we
assume:
M∗k = wMK(t0) ≡ wMk (8)
D∗k = wDk(t0) ≡ wDk (9)
where w is the wrong-way factor which gives the ratio of the stressed margin over today’s margin
level. Note that we have assumed for simplicity that the wrong-way factor is constant across
time and members and is the same for the initial margin and default fund contribution. Further
motivation for this assumption and details on how w can be estimated are given in section 4.1.
Given these assumptions, the allocation factor only depends on today’s default fund levels, i.e.:
A0(s) ≡ E [A0(ti; s)|s] = D
∗
0
D∗tot −
∑
j∈sD
∗
j
=
D0
Dtot −
∑
j∈sDj
(10)
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where D∗tot ≡
∑N
j=0D
∗
j .
3.5 Portfolio Expected Loss
The CCP risk depends on the portfolio loss distributions of all clearing members. In particular,
we need to evaluate the expectation:
E [Ltot(ti; s)|s] = E
∑
j∈s
Uj(τj)− E
+∣∣∣∣∣∣s
 (11)
which is conditional on the default scenario s. To calculate this we need to know the distribution
of
∑
j∈s Uj(τj) which, in turn, depends on the joint loss distribution of all the member portfolios.
To simplify the calculation we make the conservative assumption that E = 0. An alternative,
equally tractable approximation, would be to allocate the equity cushion to the defaulted clearing
member’s initial margin.
This means that the expectation is linearised and we have:
E [Ltot(ti; s)|s] =
∑
j∈s
E [Uj(τj)|s] (12)
=
∑
j∈s
E
[
(∆Vj(τj)−Mj(τj)−Dj(τj))+
∣∣s] (13)
≡
∑
j∈s
U j(τj ; s) (14)
Hence, we have reduced the problem to estimating the marginal distributions of the portfolio
losses, ∆Vk(ti), conditional on default. Note that using the assumptions of section 3.4 we can
write Mj(τj) and Dj(τj) as M
∗
j and D
∗
j respectively.
We propose to model the tail of the loss distribution as a Pareto distribution. To be more
precise, we assume that for k ∈ s and x ≥M∗k we have:
P [∆Vk(ti) > x|s] = pˆk(s, ti)
(
M∗k
x
)α
(15)
where α is the Pareto index that determines how fast the tail of the distribution decays. This
parameter needs to be calibrated to the underlying market as is discussed in section 4.3. The
probability of losses exceeding the initial margin in the scenario is given by:
pˆk(s, ti) = P [∆Vk(ti) > M
∗
k |s] (16)
We assume in the following that pˆk(s, ti) does not depend explicitly on time. In addition, we
assume that pˆk(s, ti) does not depend on how many or on which clearing members have defaulted,
only on the fact that there has been at least one default. This means that we can drop the s
and the t labels and write pˆk(s, ti) ≡ pˆk. Further details on how this input is determined are
provided in section 4.2.
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It follows that the conditional expected loss, Uk(ti; s) ≡ Uk, also has no explicit time or scenario
dependence. It is straightforward to calculate Uk as:
Uk ≡ E
[
(∆Vk −M∗k −D∗k)+
∣∣s] (17)
= pˆk
∫ ∞
M∗k+D
∗
k
(x−M∗k −D∗k)αM∗αk x−(α+1)dx (18)
=
pˆk
α− 1
(
M∗k
M∗k +D
∗
k
)α
(M∗k +D
∗
k) (19)
=
wpˆk
α− 1
(
Mk
Mk +Dk
)α
(Mk +Dk) (20)
which is well-defined for α > 1.
3.6 Summing over Scenarios and the Exposure to Clearing Members
We will now write equation (6) as a sum over exposures to the individual clearing members:
L0(ti) =
∑
s∈S
P (s; ti)A0(s)
∑
k∈s
Uk (21)
=
∑
s∈S
P (s; ti)A0(s)
N∑
j=1
Ik∈sUk (22)
=
N∑
k=1
Uk
∑
s∈S
Ik∈sP (s; ti)A0(s) (23)
where we have introduced the indicator function Ix which is 1 if x is true and 0 otherwise.
Note that the sum,
∑
s∈S Ik∈sP (s; ti), is the marginal probability that the member CMk defaults
in the period [ti−1, ti] and is given by:∑
s∈S
Ik∈sP (s; ti) = λk(ti)∆r (24)
where λk(ti) is the default intensity of the member, which we have assumed constant over
[ti−1, ti]. The intensity is given by:
λk(t) =
1
1− Pk(t)
dPk(t)
dt
(25)
where Pk(t) = P [τk < t] is the marginal default probability of member CMk. Note that in
equation (24) we have implicitly assumed that CMk has not defaulted prior to ti−1, since we
have not multiplied the default intensity with the survival probability up to ti. This is to be
understood in the context of our steady state assumption: in the case of default the member
would be replaced by an equivalent member.
If A0(s) did not depend on s then the expected loss would just depend on the marginal default
probabilities of each member. In order to isolate the scenario dependence of A0(s) we write for
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s ∈ S and for any k ∈ s:
A0(s) =
D0
Dtot −
∑
j∈sDj
(26)
=
D0
Dtot −Dk (1 +Bk(s)) (27)
where:
Bk(s) ≡
∑
j∈s\{k}Dj
Dtot −
∑
j∈sDj
(28)
Note that Bk(s) is 0 unless there are at least two member defaults in the scenario s.
We can now express the expected loss as:
L0(ti) = D0
N∑
k=1
Uk
Dtot −Dk (1 + εk(ti))λk(t)∆r (29)
where the correction term:
εk(t) =
1
λk(t)∆r
∑
s∈S
P (s; t)Ik∈sBk(s) (30)
is a probability weighted sum over scenarios with more than one default. It corrects for the
fact that the loss allocation is higher in multiple default scenarios and depends on the default
correlation as well as the size of the allocation period, ∆r. It can be calculated given a model
for joint member defaults.
We show the dependency of εk on the default correlation in table 1. This is based on a clearing
house with 15 members. All default fund contributions are assumed equal. The member CDS
spreads are taken to be 200 bps with a recovery rate of 40%. Finally, we use a Gaussian copula
to generate joint default probabilities. We see that εk increases exponentially with correlation.
The sensitivity to the spread and allocation period is comparatively low. For a correlation level
of 60% we see a correction term of around 15% to 20%.
∆r (days) 30 10 30
Spread (bps) 200 200 100
Correlation εk
0% 0% 0% 0%
20% 1% 1% 1%
40% 5% 3% 4%
60% 19% 13% 15%
70% 38% 27% 31%
80% 81% 62% 69%
90% 190% 160% 170%
Table 1: Sensitivity of the correction term, εk, to default correlation under different spread and
allocation period assumptions.
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3.7 Summary
The cost of the risk of CCP membership is given by:
C0(T ) = D0
n∑
i=1
Z(t0, ti)
N∑
k=1
Ukλk(ti)∆r
Dtot −Dk (1 + εk(ti)) (31)
We can take the limit of ∆r → 0 and write the total cost as a sum over clearing members as
follows:
C0(T ) = D0
N∑
k=1
E¯k
∫ T
t0
λk(t)Z(0, t)dt (32)
where the exposure is given by:
E¯k ≡ wpˆk
α− 1
(
Mk
Mk +Dk
)α Mk +Dk
Dtot −Dk (1 + εk) (33)
and we have assumed that εk(t) = εk is constant in time.
In practice, we are unlikely to have member specific information on the collateral and model
parameters and we need to approximate these with average quantities. Let us denote these by
pˆ, M , G and λ respectively. We also introduce the duration weighted average intensity:
λ¯ ≡ 1
T − t0
∫ T
t0
λ(t)Z(0, t)dt (34)
If, in addition, we assume that Mk  Dk and that εk is negligible, then we get the following
simple expression for the CCP cost:
C0(T ) ≈ wpˆ
α− 1 λ¯(T − t0)(M +G). (35)
We note that the risk is proportional to the wrong-way factor w, the breach probability pˆk, the
average default intensity, λ¯, as well as the average collateral. We have an inverse proportionality
to the Pareto index α. In addition, we see that the risk does not depend on the number of
clearing members.
4 Parameter Estimation
4.1 Estimating the Wrong-Way Factor w
The wrong-way factor, w, determines the ratio of margin levels at the time of member default
vs. today’s margin levels. To estimate the factor we assume that the initial margin and default
fund levels are VaR based. This means that the margin level is set by the CCP so that there
is a fixed probability of losses exceeding this margin over the liquidation period. We write the
portfolio loss distribution, used by the CCP in estimating the margin levels, as a function, fk,
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of a Gaussian variable Xt, i.e. ∆Vk(t) = fk(Xt). The volatility of Xt is the underlying market
volatility and denoted by σ(t).
Let us denote a collateral level at time t by Ck(t). This could either represent the initial margin
or a member’s default fund contribution. Our distributional assumption means that for a given
clearing member CMk:
p ≡ P [∆Vk(t−) > Ck(t)] = Φ
(
−f
−1
k (Ck(t))
σ(t−)
)
(36)
where Φ(·) denotes the standard cumulative normal distribution. It is important to note that
when setting the collateral level, the default of the member k has not yet occurred and hence
there is no possibility that the member default has had a chance to impact the market volatilities.
The probability of breaching the level Ck is given by p and is fixed for all times by the CCP.
We can use this to back out the collateral level as follows:
Ck(t) = fk (σ(t−)g) (37)
where g = Φ−1(1− p).
The wrong-way factor, w, is given by the ratio of collateral levels at time τk vs. time t0. This
means that we have:
w =
Ck(τk)
Ck(t0)
=
fk(σ(τk−)g)
fk(σ(t0)g)
(38)
If we assume that fk is linear then we have simply:
w =
σ(τk−)
σ(t0)
(39)
This means we can calculate w as a ratio of a stressed volatility over today’s volatility. We
assume in the following that the stressed volatility does not depend explicitly on time and is
given by:
σ(τk−) ≡ σ∗ (40)
4.1.1 Historical estimation
We estimate the wrong-way factor w in four markets: equity, credit, FX, and rates. We do this
by estimating a stress volatility of historical 5-day log-returns of the following representative
indices: S&P 500 (1981 to 2011); CDX IG (2003 to 2011); USD/GBP fx rate (1985 to 2011)
and USD 1 year swap rate (1990 to 2011). This is then compared to today’s estimate of the
volatility in order to calculate w.
Volatilities are estimated for each day of our time-series using a simple exponentially weighted
moving average (EWMA) algorithm. This means that the volatility, σi at date ti is given by:
σ2i = λσ
2
i−1 + (1− λ)r2i (41)
where ri is the 5-day log return at time ti. We set the EWMA parameter λ to 0.99. This
determines how heavily past observations are weighted relative to more recent ones.
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The stress volatility is defined as the 99% quantile in the historically estimated volatility dis-
tribution. A summary of our estimates for w is given in table 2. We observe that w ranges
between 1.3 and 2.5.
S&P 500 CDX IG USD/GBP USD
current vol (5 day) 3.3% 6.1% 1.2% 7.9%
max vol 5.8% 12.5% 3.1% 10.5%
99% vol 5.5% 12.3% 2.9% 10.1%
wrong-way-factor w 1.7 2.2 2.5 1.3
Table 2: Estimated wrong-way-factor for different markets. To calculate w we take p = 1% and
f(x) ∼ exp(σx)− 1.
4.2 Estimating the breach probability pˆk
The conditional expected tail loss Uk depends on the probability pˆk of losses breaching the initial
margin conditional on the member default. To estimate this we can again make use of the fact
that for a typical CCP the initial margin level is VaR based.
The distribution used to define the margin level is based on the market volatilities, σ∗, just prior
to the member default. As in the previous section, we assume that portfolio loss is a function
fk of a Gaussian random variable up to the margin level M
∗
k . The probability of breaching the
margin is set by the CCP and denoted by pM (typically this probability is set at pM = 1%).
This means that:
pM ≡ P [∆Vk(τk−) > M∗k ] = Φ
(
−f
−1
k (M
∗
k )
σ∗
)
(42)
Post-default we expect market stress to increase due to contagion. This means that we expect
the loss distribution volatility to increase from the level σ∗ to an even more stressed level of
σˆk > σ
∗. It is σˆk that drives the portfolio losses over the unwind period ∆l. We assume that:
σˆk = γkσ
∗ (43)
where γk ≥ 1 is the contagion stress factor. In general, this can be specific to the member k,
which is useful if we believe that some members are more systemically important and hence can
cause more market disruption in the case of default.
The probability of losses exceeding M∗k conditional on default is given by pˆk and is greater than
pM . We have:
pˆk ≡ P [∆Vk > M∗k |s]
= Φ
(
−f
−1
k (M
∗
k )
σˆk
)
= Φ
(
Φ−1(pM )
γk
)
Note that pˆk does not depend on σˆk but only on the stress factor γk and pM , which is set by
the CCP.
12
In addition to the contagion effect there are at least two further reasons for why the realised
breach probability can be higher than the estimated probability, i.e. why pˆk > pM .
• Estimating future volatilities based on historical information is difficult. The quality of
the volatility modeling varies greatly between CCP’s. Hence, it is reasonable to expect
that estimated probabilities are not always realised.
• The liquidation period ∆l that is used by the CCP might be too aggressive. Especially in
crisis situations it might take longer to unwind one or more member’s portfolios. A longer
unwind period results in a higher effective volatility of losses and hence a higher breach
probability.
4.2.1 Historical estimation
We estimate γ and pˆ using the same market data as in section 4.1.1. Note that here we only
estimate a γ factor per market and not per clearing member. In particular, for each time-series
date, ti, we calculate a backward-looking volatility, σi, and a forward-looking volatility, σ
′
i.
The backward-looking volatility is calculated using EWMA and defined via equation (41). To
calculate σ′i we use a forward-looking EWMA algorithm, i.e.:
σ′2i = λ
′σ′2i+1 + (1− λ′)r2i (44)
In our tests we set λ′ = 0.97 as this provided a good estimate of realised exceedence probabilities.
For each day we also compute the ratio γ(ti) = σ
′
i/σi. Our contagion factor, γ, is defined as
the 99% quantile in the historical γ(ti) distribution. The results of the estimation are given in
table 3. We observe a fairly stable estimation across markets with a range of γ between 2.0 and
2.6. This corresponds to stressed breach probabilities, pˆ between 12% and 18%. We note that
the sensitivity of pˆ to γ is very high.
S&P 500 CDX IG USD/GBP USD
contagion factor γ 2.1 2.0 2.3 2.6
breach probability pˆ 14% 12% 16% 18%
Table 3: Estimated contagion factor for different markets.
4.3 Estimating the Pareto Index α
We estimate the Pareto index α by analysing the return time-series in the four markets intro-
duced above. However, here we consider absolute changes in the indices over the liquidation
period (5 days) as opposed to log-returns. This is because for simple contracts, e.g. forwards or
CDS, the loss would be proportional to the absolute change in the underlying.
For each set of return data, a Pareto distribution is calibrated to match the 99% quantile of
the historical distribution. The index is then optimised to obtain a best least-squares fit of the
distribution tails below the 99% quantile.
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Our results can be found in figure 1. We observe that the Pareto distribution can provide a good
fit in the different markets. We estimate an index of α = 3.3 for equity, credit and FX markets.
For the USD rates market we observe a higher index of α = 4.4. We note that a Gaussian tail
corresponds approximately to α = 7, so in all cases the observed tails are significantly larger
than would be implied by a Gaussian distribution.
Figure 1: Pareto distribution fitted to historical distributions of absolute changes for S&P 500,
CDX, USD/GBP and USD swap rates. Gaussian tail is included for comparison.
4.4 Estimating the Expected Loss
We can use our parameter estimates to provide indicative values for the expected allocated loss
in the case of a clearing member default. This in turn can be used to calculate a CCP risk
charge. We make the following assumptions in our calculation:
• Parameters are homogeneous across all clearing members. CDS spreads for the members
are are taken to be flat at 200 bps. This implies that the default intensity is given by
λ = 200bps/(1− 40%) ≈ 333bps where 40% is a typical recovery rate.
• Typically, default fund contributions are around 3% to 10% of the posted initial margin. A
reasonable correction term is around ε = 20%. Here we assume (M/(M +G))α(1+ε) ≈ 1.
• We have assumed throughout that CCP equity is 0.
• The liquidation period is set at ∆l = 5 days.
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In this approximation the 1 year risk charge for a given member as a fraction of the total posted
collateral is given by:
C¯0 ≡ C0(1)
M +G
≈ wpˆλ¯
(α− 1) ≡ LGDtotλ¯ (45)
The total loss given default, LGDtot, gives the total notional of 1 year CDS protection required
to hedge the CCP risk (as a proportion of the total posted collateral).
The results of the calculation are summarised in table 4. We observe that LGDtot ranges between
6.9% and 17.4%. The corresponding cost of 1y protection ranges between 23 bps and 58 bps.
This is comparable to the cost of investment grade super-senior protection.
S&P 500 CDX IG USD/GBP USD
wrong-way-factor w 1.7 2.2 2.5 1.3
breach probability pˆ 14% 12% 16% 18%
Pareto index α 3.3 3.3 3.3 4.4
Protection notional LGDtot 10.3% 11.5% 17.4% 6.9%
1y CCP risk charge C¯0 34bps 38bps 58bps 23bps
Table 4: Estimated CCP risk over 1 year.
5 Conclusions and Future Directions
Membership of a clearinghouse carries risk. In this note we have presented a practical model
for quantifying the expected losses that a clearing member can incur on their posted collateral
when facing a CCP.
We have shown that the risk is given by a sum of exposures to each of the clearing members. The
exposures are driven by the member portfolio loss distribution tails which we have parameterised
by a Pareto distribution. This is calibrated to the CCP defined confidence level of losses exceed-
ing the posted initial margin levels. Key risk factors are the expected level of wrong-way-risk
and contagion, which can be estimated by analysing historical market volatilities.
We have shown that for realistic assumptions, the systemic CCP risk a clearing member is
exposed to is not negligible. The cost of protection from losses on the posted collateral is
comparable to the cost of investment grade super-senior protection.
Several directions for future research present themselves:
• Alternative parameterisations for the tail behaviour of the portfolio loss distributions can
be explored and compared to those of actual portfolios. The applicability of our assump-
tions can be examined in a wider range of markets and for different product types. A more
detailed investigation of the risk posed by particular CCPs is also possible.
• We have not considered how accounting for debt value adjustment (DVA) might impact
the CCP risk calculated here. Given that we expect CCP losses to occur in times of
systemic stress, it is likely that DVA might provide an offsetting benefit.
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• The assumptions around portfolio rollover and collateral levels through time can be refined.
• The framework described here can also be used profitably to quantify capital requirements
for centrally cleared trades as well as default fund commitments.
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